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Abstract
Background: A free obstetric care policy (FOCP) has been implemented in Morocco in 2008 in order to further decrease 
maternal mortality. 
Methods: Through in-depth interviews we explored the perceptions of health professionals in public Moroccan hospitals 
with regard to fee exemption policies. We tried to understand what drives health professionals to ignore, modify or apply 
a health policy as formulated. 
Results: Respondents express significant influences of such policies on their work environment (higher workload and 
scarcity of resources) and on the patient/provider relationship, both of which may cause a negative effect on health 
workers’ motivation. A mix of motivational determinants incites health workers in their turn to influence policy 
implementation.
Conclusion: Understanding the motivational determinants of health workers may optimize policy implementation at 
the point of service delivery.
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Implications for policy makers
• A more inclusive and bottom-up policy design may improve policy adoption by health professionals.
• Policy-makers seizing the opportunity, embedded in free healthcare (FHC) policies, to enhance patient’s participation in the healthcare system 
and patient autonomy, may contribute constructively to a better performing health system. 
Implications for the public
Health professionals appreciate free healthcare (FHC) policies from an ethical point of view. However, such policies may, if not accompanied by the 
necessary investments in health and associated sectors, become a significant burden for the health system and negatively affect its performance. 
Health professionals express significant influences of FHC policies on their working environment and conditions (higher workload and scarcity of 
resources) and on the patient/provider relationship, both of which may have detrimental effects on health workers’ motivation. A mix of motivational 
determinants incites health workers on their turn to influence policy implementation. Including professionals in policy design and planning, may 
optimize health reform processes and results.
Key Messages 
Background 
In 2002, Morocco passed a Basic Health Coverage bill aimed 
to improve financial protection for the whole population 
in case of access to health services. This law established a 
contributory Health Insurance regime for the population 
able to contribute financially into such a system, relying on 
insurance principles. It targets formally employed individuals, 
students, (ex)militaries and those entitled to a pension. 
This regime was made compulsory for formal employees 
in 2005 (AMO), through the establishment of two distinct 
schemes: one for the employees of the public and one for 
those of the private sectors. In 2016, the student scheme 
was introduced, managed under the civil servants’ national 
insurance scheme. The law made also special provisions 
for the economically deprived population through the 
establishment of a Medical Assistance Regime, the Régime 
d’Assistance Médicale (RAMED). This regime emerged from 
longstanding discussions as the optimal option to guarantee 
financial protection to vulnerable populations. After 3 years 
of piloting, the RAMED scheme was introduced nationwide 
in 2012.1 
Despite these provisions, the Moroccan government felt the 
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urge to take additional actions to improve health coverage 
through targeted fee exemptions in the public health sector. 
As maternal mortality reduction has been a top priority for 
Moroccan policymakers for several years,2 the government 
introduced a free obstetric care policy (FOCP) in 2008 
in order to accelerate the country’s progress towards the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). The FOCP aims 
to make obstetric and neonatal care in public hospitals 
accessible for all pregnant Moroccan women, regardless 
their socioeconomic status.3 The FOCP benefit package has 
been adjusted over time and currently exempts pregnant 
women from most medical costs incurred at the point of 
service for delivery, potential obstetric complications and 
caesarean section services, as well as for some of the indirect 
costs related to transport services for referral. The Ministry 
of Health compensates public hospitals through in kind and 
credit lines for drugs and supplies through the provision of 
delivery kits, vital drugs and blood products, a standard blood 
test and credit for fuel the transport between health facilities.3 
These allocations are subject to the number of services 
provided to the population. As such, the FOCP – though not 
the only, nor the first exemption policy in Morocco – is the 
first FHC policy to compensate the public service providers 
for the services rendered to the population.
Intuitively, making services free of charge improves health 
coverage. Studies, however, show that FHC policies do not 
necessarily lead to the intended effects, due to multi-faceted 
implementation gaps. Evidence suggests that while financial 
barriers are significant, on their own their reduction does not 
change behaviour, unless it is entrenched in a multipronged 
strategy that aims for positive shifts in other aspects, such 
as perception of quality and responsiveness.4 Numerous 
publications focus on contextual determinants of policy 
implementation gaps.5-8 Health (and other) policies are 
often decided upon at central level and executed in a top-
down manner. This implies that all the way down to the 
implementation, clear objectives and a precise description of 
the policy’s modalities are needed, in written guidelines and 
standardized operational procedures. If absent, managers 
and health professionals lack uniform and clear info, and 
the policy risks to not be implemented as planned. To 
improve the implementation of health policies, all actors 
of the health system need to be concerted and collaborate 
from the conception of the policy onward and all along the 
implementation process.8 
Yet, more than only process-related factors influence the 
effectiveness of policy implementation. The FEMHealth 
research project (2011-2014) assessed the effectiveness of 
free obstetric care policies in Benin, Burkina Faso, Mali, and 
Morocco. It explored the intended and intended consequences 
of these policies and how they impact, positively and/or 
negatively, local health systems.4,9 A striking phenomenon 
across these countries was the various distance between design 
and implementation. These differences existed within a given 
country, showing a strong variability in the implementation 
of a policy. Also across countries, such gap was systematically 
observed, regardless of the difference in the policy design, 
suggesting that the broader political context and the 
processes of policy formulation and implementation alone 
do not determine the effectiveness of policy implementation. 
In some sites of Benin, for example, women still paid high 
fees for accessing caesarean section, while compensation for 
caesarean delivery to the providers was proved to be sufficient 
to cover the actual costs.10 Similar observations were made in 
Burkina Faso, despite the fact that the FHC design differs in 
the two countries.11 
FEMHealth findings and several peer reviewed studies 
provide evidence for Lipsky’s street level bureaucracy theory: 
although they come last in a long hierarchical line, public 
servants are not powerless.12 They have a certain discretionary 
power allowing them to modify the implementation of a new 
policy in their best interests, with fluctuating consequences 
for the target population.
Unlike in Benin and Burkina Faso, the Moroccan FEMHealth 
study sites did not provide evidence of local differences in 
policy implementation. This raised a number of questions, 
among others with regard to the impact of the political and 
cultural context of a country on the extent and the use of 
discretionary power. 
In this paper, we present the results of a study that aimed 
exploring the distance between what is formulated at 
central level and what eventually is implemented by the 
health professional. It addressed the question: what drives a 
professional to ignore, modify or apply a policy as formulated? 
We sought answers through a qualitative study to explore the 
perspectives of health professionals in Moroccan hospitals 
with regard to FHC policies. The study results may lead to 
optimization of health policy implementation, in order to 
maximize chances on achieving the planned objectives, which 
is what effective implementation actually entails.13
Methods
This is a qualitative study in which data were collected 
through in-depth interviews and analysed using a thematic 
analysis approach. The authors obtained ethical approval 
from their institutes.
Data Collection
Data were collected in seven hospitals distributed over 
six Moroccan health provinces or Délégations Sanitaires 
Provinciales (DSP), namely Tetouan, Settat, Al Haouz, Sidi 
Kacem, Kenitra and Marrakech. We selected sites that differed 
in service utilization, population concentration and poverty 
index.14 
We contacted the regional health officer who sent an official 
letter to the selected hospitals, informing the director of 
the study objectives. They informed midwives, doctors 
and supervisors in the maternity of the potential request to 
participate in the study, before or after their working hours.
The interviews took place on-site – except two that were done 
outside the work place – in the third week of July 2016. All 
interviews were conducted in French, with a French-Berber 
interpreter assisting in one interview and a French-Arabic 
interpreter in one other. Prior to the interview, respondents 
were asked for a written consent and permission to record 
the interview. Notes were taken simultaneously. A semi-
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structured interview guide was used and following topics – 
plus any other emerging from the interview – were discussed: 
policy information and implementation modalities, ethical 
and professional appreciation of FHC, and perceived changes 
in the work environment, in the patient-provider relationship 
and in the work motivation. The average duration of an 
interview was 45 minutes.
Data Analysis
Data were analysed manually and thematically. A thematic 
diagram (Figure) was constructed in a theory-driven 
manner.15 The themes’ choice was inspired by peer-reviewed 
literature5,7,16-19 and FEMHealth results.9,14,20
Validity
In order to increase the credibility of this study, several 
procedures were used following standards of qualitative 
research.21,22
Amongst other, data were triangulated making use of 
different sources, namely interviews of staff with different 
functions, hospital statistics and the reports of earlier studies 
in the same hospital settings (FEMHealth project). When 
respondents had an outlier explanation for a phenomenon we 
encouraged them to go beyond the questions of the interview 
guide. Interpretation bias was avoided by discussing the 
coding among three researchers and by using two different 
theoretical frameworks: Lipsky’s Street Level Bureaucracy 
theory and Franco’s theory of motivational influences on 
health professionals.
Results 
Before presenting the results, we clarify that the RAMED 
policy was scaled up after the FOCP, but respondents tend 
to mention RAMED in the same breath as the FOCP when 
discussing the effects of FHC policies. We chose not to 
differentiate when not done so by the respondents. We took 
into account their perception of all FHC policies. In principle 
though, the RAMED card does not serve within the walls of 
the maternity. 
Characteristics of Respondents and Their Initial Motivation 
to Work in Health Sector
We interviewed 19 health professionals of whom 14 are 
women. Three work in a university hospital, five in provincial 
and ten in regional hospitals. Fifteen provide healthcare on 
a daily basis: seven nurse-midwives, one gynaecologist, and 
seven nurse supervisors. Further, four high-level managers 
were interviewed, upon their explicit request to be included 
as interviewee. The average professional experience of the 
respondents is 12 years (based on information from 13 
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respondents) and respondents are, on average, nine years 
functional in the current workplace (based on information 
from 16 respondents). For most of the study respondents the 
gratifying aspect of caring for people has been a major reason 
to choose for a job in the health sector. Another motivating 
factor is the professional security offered by a job in the public 
sector. Most respondents for whom the job was not a vocation, 
state to have learned to appreciate the task little by little. “I did 
not choose by love. Now I love this profession, but I really don’t 
like the work conditions, they are not satisfying” (R11).
Modalities and Effectiveness of Policy Implementation
Health providers acknowledge that the FOCP was clearly 
formulated on paper, detailing the exempted package of care. 
Yet, they report a lack of training and guidelines for those that 
are involved in the practical implementation of the policy. 
Several professionals argue that their knowledge of the policy 
was mainly based on what they heard in the media. Regarding 
public sensitization campaigns in general, some respondents 
state that they were not sufficiently adapted to the vulnerable, 
being mostly illiterate and unaware of Moroccan politics. 
“They might have heard some things, but have not been 
explained their rights. We still receive people from rural 
areas who are entitled to a RAMED card, but who don’t have 
any. It is poor sensitization” (R18).
While hospital directors wonder who will pay for FHC given 
the fact that maternities are traditionally revenue-generating 
departments within hospitals, respondents are unanimous: 
hospital directors have put in place the FOCP the day after the 
ministerial letter’s arrival. Yet respondents enumerate several 
exceptions on free obstetric care today. First, at tertiary level, 
women pay for all medical acts, including caesarean sections, 
if they do not present a referral letter or RAMED card. 
Second, gynaecology acts, ultrasound and curettage inclusive, 
are not exempted. Third, stock ruptures oblige parturients 
to buy drugs and supplies themselves in many cases. Fourth, 
transport between first and higher level of care is often paid 
for by the patient because of insufficient gasoline for the 
ambulance. 
Also for holders of the RAMED card, exceptions on FHC 
exist. Moreover, they are explicitly formulated in the RAMED 
policy, stating that the RAMED covers care for the poor and 
vulnerable “within the resources available.” Consequently, 
many beneficiaries are asked to buy supplies and drugs, or to 
go elsewhere for further examination.
These exceptions on FHC demonstrate that policy 
implementation has been partly impeded by the policymakers 
to start with: 
“The support to the policy was not as such that service is 
available everywhere. In the beginning, there was financial 
space, so many people benefited from service. Now both 
policies start their last breath and are declining” (R14).
Where FHC policies are not implemented as supposed to, 
respondents seek the cause in a deficient mobilization of 
resources, which leads to care seekers and caretakers being 
urged to look for solutions that become in their turn an 
embedded problem: 
“Corruption has a simple rule. When the means are limited 
and the demand is unlimited, you need money to have a bed, 
a service. That is how it works everywhere in the world. So 
corruption became structural” (R14). 
Several respondents argue that a more participatory approach 
would have benefited the implementation of the policies. 
Health professionals were consulted but did not actively take 
part in the design of FHC policies. When asked what could be 
success factors in health system reform, respondents reply that 
participation and engagement of all stakeholders (managers, 
providers, users) is key: 
“During our studies we have learned that, to succeed in 
policy change, one needs to involve the people” (R2). 
Prior to exploring providers’ appreciation of FHC policies, 
we acknowledge the context in which Moroccan health 
professionals implement health policies designed at central 
level. The FOCP started off as priority number one for the 
government under the guidance of the female minister for 
whom the women’s cause was almost a personal matter. 
“There was fuss, field missions and inspections. Some 
hospital directors were fired as a consequence of maternal 
deaths, unavailability of blood, communication problems, 
unworthy referral conditions for patients… Automatically, 
this policy became a priority for everyone” (R6).
Appreciation of FHC Policies: “Politics Rather Than Good 
Management of Health”
Acknowledging that neonatal and maternal mortality has a lot 
of determinants, respondents doubt the effectiveness of the 
FOCP in reducing maternal and neonatal mortality:
“Whether women come or not, it depends on how far they 
live, that is all” (R7). 
According to respondents, quality of care remains poor, or 
even has deteriorated due to an influx of patients and a lack of 
input in all building blocks of the health system. 
“These policies are not national priorities: they [policy 
makers] are after quantity, not quality” (R4).
Respondents also question the sustainability of these policies. 
They are unanimous: FHC policies are expensive and, 
considering the country’s budgetary deficiency and fragile 
economic context, not made to last. 
Influences of FHC Policies on Personal (Health Professionals) 
Level
From an ethical point of view, health professionals feel 
somehow satisfied being able to provide FHC to care seekers. 
They speak of a humanitarian mission, which they consider 
part of public service. It feeds their intrinsic motivation. On 
the other hand, work satisfaction is said to have “taken a free 
fall” because of decreasing quality of care, worsening working 
conditions, the feeling of being pursued rather than protected 
in the exercise of medical care and a lack of recognition for 
health professionals in general by both the authorities and the 
community. 
A first negative association between FHC policies and health 
workers’ motivation is caused by deteriorating working 
conditions. Respondents unanimously consider workload to 
be substantially higher after the implementation of FOCP. As 
a consequence of the changing work environment, a negative 
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effect is observed on the quality of care: 
“These policies can increase the number of patients seen 
but there is collateral damage with regards to quality, users’ 
satisfaction and even our own cost-efficiency” (R5).
Secondly, and adding to the impression to work in 
unacceptable conditions, respondents mention a lack of 
recognition by the community and the authorities. Media 
sensationalize maternal death stories; health professionals 
and hospital managers are made responsible for a maternal 
death when it occurs on their watch, and risk to be fired and/
or sentenced: 
“Look at the mediatization: they set the population against 
us. That is what the minister does” (R4).
Increased stress on the work floor, increasing expectations 
of the community and the healthcare users, reinforced 
supervision by authorities and mediatization of medical 
errors create an environment of fear and mistrust. Health 
professionals feel pursued rather than protected in the exercise 
of medical care. The state is not seen as a partner or protecting 
agency, but as the one endangering the public agent. 
“We are not protected. Nothing motivates me. Why will I pay 
to clean up the mess when the state does not cover me? It is 
better for me to refer the women” (R4).
Finally, despite deteriorating work conditions, FHC policies 
did not positively influence the revenue of health professionals. 
Public agents’ revenue only increases through seniority or by 
an evolution in grade after having succeeded in an exam. 
Still, respondents describing their professional motivation as 
strongly intrinsic (being motivated by the idea of caring for 
people and making a true difference in the lives of some) argue 
that FHC policies have affected their professional satisfaction. 
“When practicing a profession with love, we give a lot; we 
forget all of the constraints of the policy” (R9).
Influence of FHC Policies on Structural (Hospital and Services) 
Level
Respondents observe an influence of FHC policies at 
organizational level: service utilization has increased, which in 
turn led to an inadequacy of (human and material) resources, 
which in turn contributed to decreased quality of care and 
eventually to increased health inequity.
In Morocco, the institutional delivery rate increased 
significantly since the initiation of the FOCP, also among poor 
or vulnerable women, which was one of the major aims of the 
policy. Yet, respondents wonder whether increased access to 
healthcare of poor (or worsening) quality truly translates into 
increased accessibility: 
“The problem is that politicians are not interested in the 
quality of care, but only concerned by how many deliveries 
we assist. Accessibility has not really increased by this policy” 
(R3).
Respondents state that health providers’ mentality has 
changed due to this focus on quantity:
“It causes falsification of files. A woman dies and because 
of fear for complaints, we meet and create another file, a 
scenario which we discuss afterwards in the maternal death 
audit. If we exceed a certain number of deaths, we lose fees 
and credit. We cheat on the maternal death audits. It’s done 
everywhere, I think” (R7).
No additional staff has been appointed in the aftermath of (or 
prior to) FOCP implementation – or at least not in correlation 
with the increased demand. Combined with cross-posts, 
sick leaves and retired professionals who were not replaced, 
this caused a relative scarcity of health providers. Under the 
FOCP, drug and equipment kits are provided, and in some 
places infrastructure was improved. However, the patient 
influx after the implementation caused stocks to be consumed 
rapidly, affecting mainly postpartum care: 
“Keeping women and newborns for 48 hours implies the need 
for 90 beds. We only have 60. This policy affects correct case 
management negatively. No means, no resources, no time, no 
beds, no space in the operation theatre… This is more or less 
due to the FHC” (R15). 
Respondents are explicit about the effect of FHC policies on 
the quality of care: 
“It is catastrophic. It’s impossible to talk about ‘safe 
motherhood’. It is unsafe motherhood. I have staff on duty 
since yesterday morning 8:00 am. It is logical that errors 
occur” (R7). 
The conditions described above cause a certain degree of 
stress and fear, eg, to be pursued in justice. 
Furthermore, some respondents indicate a segmentation of 
the health system since FHC policies have been introduced, 
with public hospitals becoming hospitals for the poor and 
wealthy people going to private clinics. This would imply more 
health inequity, instead of less as aimed for by FHC policies. 
Others argue that even for the poor, the public hospital is the 
last resort. They prefer to put themselves into debt in order 
to find quality care in the private sector. Healthcare users, 
wealthy and poor, are said to practice cherry picking: they 
take what is free in public facilities and go in the private sector 
for all what is to be paid for.
Influences of FHC Policies and Patient (Community)/ 
Provider Relationship: “We Are Social Workers Now, Rather 
Than Healthcare Providers”
Respondents argue that FHC policies have generated high 
expectations in the community, but also that it had a negative 
influence on the patient/provider relationship. 
First, according to respondents, patients consider conditions 
of admission and hospitalization as not satisfying. For many, 
such negative experience contributes to a negative impression 
of the overall quality of care. Moreover, respondents believe 
that they have less time for patients since the implementation 
of FHC. Some strongly intrinsically motivated respondents 
try to mitigate this limited availability through better 
communication with the patients. 
Second, respondents argue that healthcare users do not 
appreciate FHC because people feel useless or like a burden 
when receiving everything for free. Moreover, they say that 
FHC is considered to be care of low quality, a perception that 
is reinforced by the impressions patients have upon admission 
in the hospital. Some respondents state to have been asked by 
patients to “be allowed to pay” in order to have better quality 
care. In the same logic, a health manager explained that the 
hospital bills are presented to RAMED patients, in order for 
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them to see what has been exempted: 
“Those praising the RAMED are those who received care for 
serious or costly diseases or surgical interventions; people 
talking badly about it are the others” (R6).
Finally, several health professionals come to the conclusion 
that FHC policies strongly influence the power relationship 
between provider and care seeker: 
“The RAMED changed a lot of things in our country. 
The patient’s perception of his dignity has changed. It has 
improved the care seeker’s confidence and consequently 
created a conflict with the caregiver. The RAMED policy 
also slightly changed the providers’ attitude: they have more 
respect for the patient now” (R1). 
Care seekers feel in a stronger position now that they are 
‘entitled’, have the right to access (free) care. Respondents 
speak of more self-esteem and autonomy of the healthcare 
user, which the caregiver is not used to and might interpret as 
aggression or lack of gratitude. The result is a reciprocal and 
iterative process: 
“Patients become more aggressive. We too. We have not 
eaten, we are submerged by work and easily overlook some 
things. We make mistakes” (R4).
An important nuance was made by respondents with regard 
to the healthcare users’ lower esteem of and trust in health 
providers. Respondents do not associate this phenomenon to 
FCH policies but mention the following causes:
Generational changes: Respondents observe a generational 
transformation at both patient and provider level: 
“Young people have another mentality. They assert their 
rights. Even the staff is not the same as in the past. They 
demand too much. Before, we worked without being aware 
of our rights” (R18).
Provider attitude and practices: Respondents attribute the 
lack of esteem for health professionals to frequent corruption 
among doctors, absenteeism and poor contact with patients. 
“There is no longer the image of the doctor as the wise 
person, no longer the sublime glance the doctor had in the 
past” (R14). 
Esteem for the other does not change unilaterally: 
“People are less grateful and we are more mistrustful, for we 
do not work in a climate of trust and security. Hence, we do 
not give and do not draw the best out of ourselves” (R4).
Politics/media: The political rhetoric and the media, loudly 
diffusing that everything is available in the public hospitals, 
play an important role. 
“People come with demands, and are disappointed upon 
arrival” (R16).
Urbanization: In rural areas, patients need to create a link 
with only one, maximum two midwives. 
“They consider her a member of the family. Continuity of 
care is offered by only one midwife. At hospital level, there are 
several midwives. Patients cannot have trust in all” (R12).
Finally, some respondents do not see any link between FHC 
policies and the patient-provider relationship: 
“My professional relationship has not changed. I always treat 
the patients correctly; it is how I was educated” (R17). 
They believe the mentality constraints can be overcome: 
“If we treat patients equally, we never have problems with 
them” (R10).
Recommendations Formulated by Health Professionals
No respondent rejected the idea of vulnerable persons being 
exempted from payment for healthcare. Nevertheless, they 
argued that policymakers ideally first reflect on alternative 
efficient and rational processes, and ensure the means to 
finance FHC policies before actually introducing them. 
Although most respondents do not believe FHC to be 
sustainable, they are convinced that scaling back is impossible: 
“FHC policies are acquired rights now, socially irreversible” 
(R14).
Yet, the following corrections and recommendations are 
proposed:
Revision of FHC policy design: In order to mitigate the impact 
of FHC on hospitals in densely populated areas, eg, on the 
availability and quality of care, most respondents suggest 
FHC to be provided only to the poor. 
Respondents believe a basic health coverage regime such as 
the RAMED may replace the FOCP, on the condition that its 
eligibility criteria are revised in order to be sure to reach the 
truly vulnerable. Respondents also suggest revising the FOCP 
by: (1) including transport from home to the first level of care 
in the exempted package of care, since respondents believe this 
could shorten the first and second delay in seeking healthcare 
and therefore be an effective measure in combatting maternal 
morbidity and mortality; and (2) excluding elective caesarean 
sections from fee exemption, for “if it is scheduled, it is not 
urgent” (R18).
Appropriate input to all elements of the health system: 
Respondents regret the fact that effects of FHC policies 
on the health system have been insufficiently anticipated 
beforehand. Several recommendations involve an increased 
input into public health facilities: more and qualified human 
resources, a more complete and rapid cost recovery, a better 
availability of drugs, equipment and infrastructure (including 
beds and ambulances). 
“The citizen does not expect spectacular actions like organ 
transplants, but sustainable and outreach services. If we 
succeed in financing our public hospitals and provide them 
with sufficient human resources, we have nothing to envy the 
private sector for” (R6).
Respondents request decision-makers to provide them with 
the means needed to offer the promised FHC. 
Quality enhancing measures: To mitigate the collateral 
damage of FHC policies on the quality of care, respondents 
recommend to strengthen all levels of care from the bottom 
(primary healthcare) onward, in order to decongest the 
tertiary level. Reinforcement could be done by allocating 
more staff and material to each level, but also by task shifting, 
eg, training midwives in the use of ultrasound: 
“It increases the midwives’ and the doctor’s motivation. It is 
not the RAMED, but a climate of confidence and security, 
that will improve the quality of care” (R4). 
Furthermore, respondents suggest strengthening the existing 
quality surveillance tool in Moroccan hospitals, the Concours 
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Qualité,23 by building on the expertise of health professionals. 
They argue that the current tool gives much importance to 
the patients’ opinions, while only health professionals really 
comprehend what quality is. 
“Patients only see the cleanliness” (R3).
Incentives to mitigate the risk of demotivation: Respondents 
suggest strategies to motivate health professionals, among 
which offering training to healthcare providers and including 
them in discussions on health reform – for they consider 
themselves representatives of the community.
“The authorities, at hospital and at state level, need to 
acknowledge health professionals, especially those who give 
a lot. We need to feel their recognition” (R9). 
Financial incentives are welcomed: 
“If midwives would be paid a symbolic price for every delivery 
they attend to, eg, 20 dirhams (two euros), you will see they 
will really give. A performance based payment that should 
also include the quality - for the mistake we make often is 
putting quantity before quality” (R7).
Discussion 
Lipsky’s street level bureaucracy theory has been proven 
a useful theory to explain the modification or deficient 
implementation of a policy.5,17,19,24,25 Literature review and 
FEMHealth data, however, suggest that not all health 
professionals use their discretionary power. Some studies 
describe situations of conflict between different motivational 
influences. In Ghana, researchers categorized providers’ 
arguments pro et contra abortion in determinants related 
to public health knowledge, professional ethics, human 
rights, religion and morality, and concluded that it is exactly 
the complex interaction between these arguments that 
caused tensions and dilemmas among the providers.25 This 
study suggests that trying to marry contradictory personal 
determinants could be a potential reason for health workers 
to not implement a policy or to modify its contents or 
modalities. 
Another potential reason for using one’s discretionary power 
is the potentially negative impact of the concerned policy on 
the work environment, for example on the workload or the 
revenue of health structures. A study of the impact of a fee 
exemption policy on health staff in Zambia found that health 
workers’ motivation was influenced in two ways: at the one 
hand the policy caused additional workload (through more 
clients and a lack of additional staff who used to be paid 
through user fees), decreased revenue for health centers 
(leading to stock rupture) as well as for providers (losing their 
bonus covered by user fees); on the other hand, providers 
claimed to be intrinsically motivated by the fact they were 
now able to provide care to all, including the poor.26 Similar 
contradictory motivational influences have been observed 
in our current study, explaining a certain duality in health 
workers’ perception and attitude towards the policy and the 
clients.
Erasmus points out that parts of the street level bureaucracy 
theory are overrepresented in studies that apply the concept 
to the health sector: the effects of workload and of limited 
work tools and resources on the discretion of providers-
bureaucrats modifying the concerned policy, are rather well 
explained, while other work conditions (though described 
in the original theory of Lipsky) are not.27 Not all street 
level bureaucracy is grounded in intrapersonal factors; 
also contradictory organizational objectives may strongly 
influence the health workers’ attitude.27 A lack of guidelines 
for policy implementation, for example, can be perceived as a 
difficulty for the provider to achieve the objectives.24 Another 
example is a situation wherein objectives are contradictory 
and resources inadequate: eg, the government reimbursing 
health structures only partially for the free care they offer, 
Ghanaian providers deserted gratuity in an attempt to protect 
their institution from difficulties in paying creditors for drugs, 
consumables and other needs.24
Several studies demonstrate the association between process-
related determinants and policy implementation.6-8 Effective 
policy implementation, however, is about more than clear 
policy formulation, excellent communication and strong 
collaboration between all stakeholders. At the point of service 
delivery, health workers may play a key role in shaping the 
way the policies are implemented.17,19,25 They are stimulated to 
do so when FHC policies strongly influence their professional 
environment and motivation.24,26,28,29 While effects of workload 
and of limited work tools and resources on the discretion of 
providers are rather well explained in studies applying Lipsky’s 
theory to the health sector, other effects, such as contradictory 
organizational objectives24 and the modification by providers 
of their conceptions and clients’ conceptions,27 are not. 
Here, Franco’s model of motivational influences may be 
useful.30 It provides relevant insights in why the mechanism 
of street level bureaucracy is incited in one individual and 
not (or less) in another. Health providers are motivated at 
three levels: the individual level, the organizational level 
and the community level, including the interactions with 
patients. One is never influenced by a sole determinant; a mix 
of influences in interaction with an individual’s personality, 
at a specific moment in time, will determine the health 
workers’ attitude. Health sector reform, such as the FOCP, 
may influence intrapersonal determinants directly, or may 
do so through its effects on the organizational structures and 
interaction between community and patients – as elucidated 
by our study respondents. Increased patient influx without 
adequate means to cope with it may affect the individual’s 
ability – real and perceived – to carry out her/his tasks, and 
therefore stimulate or demotivate professionals in adoption 
of organization goals. Communities, too, may influence on 
health staff ’s motivation through expectations regarding 
service delivery, through patient/provider interactions and 
through patients’ feedback on the providers’ performance.30 
Health sector reform such as the introduction of a FHC 
policy, is likely to affect organizational systems and culture 
by changing the role of the community and patients. Study 
respondents indeed feel that their relationship to the care 
seeker has changed: he/she is more demanding for attention 
and quality care since he/she feels (and is) entitled to 
something. It comes with expectations – and disappointment, 
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sometimes aggression, when those are not met. Intrapersonal 
values of the health professional, such as altruism, prestige, 
professionalism, security and unmet expectations are 
challenged by the patient’s demands. This, together with 
changes at organizational level (hospital) in the aftermath of 
FHC policies, influences health providers’ perceptions and 
attitude, and may affect their motivation.28
At first sight, few street level bureaucrats are spotted in the 
Moroccan health system. Are there none? There are. Yet, from 
the Moroccan example becomes clear that the footnotes in 
Lipsky’s theory should be read and respected: health workers 
are not the de facto decision makers that some make of them; 
public servants do not operate in a vacuum.25 Health workers 
are framed by context and culture, as well as by organizational 
and social hierarchies. This may explain why examples of 
the use of discretionary power are less manifest in politically 
authoritarian contexts with highly centralized health systems, 
such as the Moroccan one. 
A first example of discretionary power put to use by 
Moroccan health professionals concerns the gratuity of care. 
Despite FHC policies being implemented “immediately and 
according to the letter,” informal conversations with care 
seekers and grey literature suggest that many Moroccans still 
pay for delivery-related acts and drugs. Once at ease in the 
conversation, study respondents confirm: patients pay for 
drugs that are not available, for gasoline for the ambulance, 
for ultrasound and so forth. Respondents state that corruption 
has become structural in Morocco because of a continuous 
imbalance between a limited offer and an unlimited demand 
- an imbalance reinforced by the FHC policies. At structural 
level, we see a lack of resources and an organizational culture 
based on negotiation and relational rather than procedural or 
formal arrangements. Personal factors play a role as well: to 
be able to give someone the appropriate care by purchasing 
the necessary treatment using the fee paid by the care seeker, 
is mentioned as motivating for the health professional 
confronted with stock shortages. Community and users share 
responsibility for this practice: according to respondents, 
patients ask to pay something in exchange for care of good 
quality. Finally, as suggested by one of the study respondents, 
the cultural and political context, not spared from corruption, 
may have an exemplary role and as such enhance, or 
legitimize, this practice at hospital level. In order to avoid 
health workers abusing, FHC policies should be precisely 
prepared with elucidation of revenue-raising modalities and 
purchasing arrangements that guarantee best value for money 
– identified through health technology assessments. Using a 
system approach is an absolute condition for an FHC policy 
to be an effective step towards universal health coverage.
A second example of discretionary power is provided by 
the way maternal death audits are done. Being an important 
mortality surveillance (hence quality improvement) tool, 
clinical audits of maternal deaths are systematically put in 
place since 2008.2 Interviewees declare those audits not to 
be truthful. Health workers exaggerate the health status of 
the woman when in their facility, so it seems her health only 
deteriorated in the referral hospital. Fear and an inadequate 
accountability model may be at the basis of this practice. 
Health professionals express to be scared of being declared 
responsible for the patient’s death, and of the consequences 
of such judgment. Belgian jurisdiction may provide an 
exemplary alternative: it increasingly holds the system 
(hospital) and not the health professional responsible for 
medical erring. The patient rights’ law of 2002 foresees in a 
central hospital liability, whereby the applicant does not need 
to identify the health workers responsible.31 The hospital can 
be summoned if the damage occurred in the hospital where 
the health workers were practicing. After all, often it is not 
clear whether and to what extent a health professional has 
erred. Moreover, if a fault or negligence is proven, chances are 
that it is actually a series of errors, hence involving several 
professionals who all represent only one cogwheel in a 
complex system. Maternal death audits can only be effective 
when implemented in a climate of confidence. Blaming and 
judgment weaken this instrument’s effectiveness. In order to 
avoid health workers to abuse this tool and as such hollow its 
efficacy, we strongly recommend creating a confidential and 
secure environment, in which health providers find the space 
to work in alignment with their professional ethics, to react 
timely, to collaborate and to take responsibility. 
The examples above demonstrate that reasons for not 
implementing a policy as planned are variable and not 
necessarily linked to intrapersonal factors. Providers also 
pursue organizational goals and seek to satisfy the community 
of which they are member. A key notion in our study seems 
to be the frontline responsibility. Who bears the responsibility 
of the state failure to comply with its promised free care, eg, 
when a health provider is unable to provide a patient with the 
necessary treatment due to stock rupture? What would be the 
conditions for ‘frontliners’ (health professionals) to bear this 
responsibility? The absolute minimum would be: not feeling 
endangered. Better would be: feeling protected. In Maslow’s 
hierarchy of needs, indicating how people in general achieve 
a sense of satisfaction, “safety and security” comes second, 
after the need for food and water. Higher needs (social, 
esteem and status, self-actualization) cannot be satisfied if 
lower-level needs are not met.32 Not feeling protected then 
leads to the impossibility to feel satisfied, even if esteem 
and recognition would be experienced. Another interesting 
motivational theory is Adam’s equity theory, suggesting that 
employees are more or less motivated based on the degree to 
which they believe they are being treated fairly, particularly 
by their supervisors and managers.33 When employees feel 
they are putting in more effort than their peers, yet do not 
believe to be appropriately rewarded for that effort, they are 
likely to be unmotivated. This accounts as well for employees 
who feel their level of pay is not equitable compared to other 
employees or other companies. Both examples were found 
among the respondents of this study.
Can FHC policies be a relevant add-on to basic health 
coverage schemes? Study respondents believe alternatives 
could be explored before turning to FHC policies. If put in 
place, FHC policies need to be carefully prepared for two 
reasons: in order to achieve their objective – making access of 
the poor to (quality) care possible – and in order to mitigate 
unwanted side effects, such as shortage of human, material 
Van der Veken et al
International Journal of Health Policy and Management, 2018, 7(12), 1110–11191118
and financial resources, deteriorating work conditions 
and decreased motivation in health professionals. Among 
accompanying measures to optimize policy implementation 
is the reinforcement of workforce motivation. Since health 
professionals are both intrinsically and extrinsically 
motivated, financial incentives are not sufficient as a 
reinforcing measure.34
Strengths and Limitations of the Study
This study has a number of limitations. In-depth interviews 
were held in the native language of neither interviewer nor 
respondents. We mitigated through the use of an interpreter 
in two interviews, and through discussion of study results 
with fellow researchers, most of whom have extensive 
knowledge of the Moroccan context and culture. Secondly, 
we built the study on a relatively small number of interviews. 
Moreover, few gynaecologists were available. An added value 
was provided by the self-expressed interest of high-level 
managers in study participation. Most of hospital managers 
being specialized doctors, it partly compensates the lack of 
this profile among the health providers. Lastly, healthcare 
users were not interviewed. Additional qualitative research 
focusing on users’ perceptions is needed to fully understand 
the complex interactions within the health system, and how 
they are influenced by FHC policies.
Conclusion
Health professionals appreciate FHC policies from an ethical 
point of view. However, they question the effectiveness of such 
policies if not accompanied by the necessary investments, 
both in health and associated sectors. They argue that fee 
exemption may negatively influence service delivery and 
public health worker motivation, potentially leading to 
perverse effects. Health professionals mention an increased 
workload, insufficient resources, infrastructural constraints 
and changes in the patient/provider relationship as main 
causes for these negative influences. Study respondents 
confirm that health reform, such as FHC policies, generates a 
power shift in the patient/provider relationship. Demotivating 
for some, this may also create new opportunities, such as 
more patient autonomy and increased participation.
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